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HYPERREALITY, INTERTEXTUALITY, 
AND THE STUDY OF LATIN POETRY*
ENRICA SCIARRINO 
INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, the creation of models is a mainstay of the scientifi c mind-
set. The idea is to capture the distinctive or essential features of a phenom-
enon through a simplifi ed or idealized representation of it. Not all models 
are ontologically the same. They can be descriptive and, therefore, con-
stituted by language, but they can also be non-linguistic and have visual 
and object-like qualities. Whatever the case, every model raises important 
questions about its relationship with the phenomenon that it seeks to grasp 
and the method or procedure by which a model is applied back to the phe-
nomenon.1 My aim in this article is to assess the methodological scope of 
intertextuality in light of recent and less recent refl ections on the power 
of images and the notion of the hyperreal. My goal is to enable an open 
conversation within and beyond disciplinary and sub-disciplinary bound-
aries, and to continue to do so despite institutional crises and differences 
of opinions, experiences, and backgrounds.
As one of Arethusa’s readers rightly points out, my contribu-
tion “reads more like a suggestive lecture than a carefully argued and 
 * I should like to thank the many people who patiently contributed to the writing of this 
rather idiosyncratic piece. Audiences in Berkeley, Vancouver, and Christchurch, Siobhan 
McElduff, Tesse Stek, Terry Austrin, Tom Habinek, Chris Jones, Lily Nabi, Julia Shirar, 
Simon Ogden, and many others. To Giulia, for her courage and her freshness. Translations 
are mine unless noted.
 1 A good map of issues relating to scientifi c models can be found in the Stanford Encyclo-
pedia of Philosophy at http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/models-science/
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documented journal article.” It does indeed, and I left it so intentionally. 
I was collecting ideas and texts for this little project when, on the early 
morning of September 4, 2010, a 7.1 earthquake hit Christchurch, the city 
in which I live and work. On that occasion, the city suffered serious dam-
age (including the library), but fortunately there were no fatalities. On 
February 22, 2011, on the same day the library fi nally reopened and the 
second day of the new academic year, another major earthquake hit the 
city. This time 185 people died, and it is unclear how many were injured. 
A week later, we resumed teaching in tents set up on campus and carried 
on business “as usual” throughout the whole year, without libraries to 
go to, and offering support as best we could to the students who did not 
fl ee the city. This article has developed in that environment. Most of the 
considerations that it contains arose during precious conversations with 
friends and colleagues, while browsing notes scattered in notebooks and 
electronic documents, and through Google searches. Accordingly, this is 
a theoretical refl ection, but it is also an experiment in what it means to 
pursue humanistic work in crisis situations—and to keep doing so in spite 
of major disruptions and minimal resources.
DISCOURSE AND RELATED MATTERS
In the last decades, the term “discourse” has become increasingly common 
in a variety of disciplines, so much so that it is invariably left undefi ned 
as if its meaning were self-explanatory. In the analysis of literary texts, 
“discourse” invokes the work of a group of French philosophers of the late 
60s. Michel Foucault is one of them, and in his Archaeology of Knowledge, 
he defi nes discourse as follows (1972.80):
Instead of gradually reducing the rather fl uctuating mean-
ing of the word “discourse,” I believe that I have in fact 
added to its meanings: treating it sometimes as the general 
domain of all statements, sometimes as an individualiz-
able group of statements, and sometimes as a regulated 
practice that accounts for a number of statements.
In the fi rst defi nition, discourse is an entity made out of sequences 
of signs organized in the form of enouncements (enoncés) or statements; 
in the second, discourse is the combination of statements that character-
ize large bodies of knowledge: something comparable to the disciplines 
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or areas of human endeavor. In the third, it blends with practice and the 
cumulative norms that determine the production of specifi c statements.
Foucault’s defi nition of discourse draws heavily on Ferdinand de 
Saussure’s understanding of the linguistic sign and the enormous success 
that this understanding has encountered among theorists. In his Course in 
General Linguistics (1916, French ed.), de Saussure distinguished between 
parole and langue. Parole refers to the realm of individual moments of 
language use—of particular “utterances” or “messages,” whether spoken 
or written—and langue to the system or code of the language (le code de 
la langue) or, to put it in de Saussure’s words, to “the social product of 
the faculty of speech and a collection of necessary conventions that have 
been adopted by a social body to permit individuals to exercise that fac-
ulty” (de Saussure 1959.9). According to de Saussure, the linguistic sign 
emerges from a dyadic relation between parole and langue, consisting of 
a form or a sound-image, the signifi er (signifi ant)—which belongs to the 
area of parole—and its concept, the signifi ed (signifi é)—which belongs 
to the area of langue. De Saussure saw this relation as being arbitrary, by 
which he meant motivated by social conventions.
What makes the term discourse appealing, then, is the feeling of 
both groundlessness and groundedness that it generates: on the one hand, 
it destabilizes the unity of individual signs and the relationship between 
signifi er (parole) and signifi ed (langue); on the other hand, it privileges 
language as a basis of analysis and circumscribes any experience of the 
world (including practice) within the limits of language itself. What fol-
lows is that any understanding of “text” based on discourse is linguisti-
cally constructed, and so is any embodied experience related to it. In this 
respect, it is important to keep in mind that discourse is less a methodol-
ogy than a model. As a model, it is an expression of a long-existing tra-
dition that goes back to the concept of logos and is a manifestation of a 
very specifi c moment in intellectual history. In his assessment of Warren 
Neidich’s work, Norman Bryson offers an acute representation of what I 
am trying to say here (2003.2–3; emphasis in original):
The effort of the “linguistic turn” in philosophy lies in 
transforming questions asked of Being into questions 
asked of language. In the later philosophy of Wittgenstein, 
for example, “the limits of my language are the limits of 
my world.” Which is to say that the language with which 
consciousness thinks does not picture or represent the 
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world directly; rather, language itself is the primary real-
ity, and attempts to establish the existence of a world out-
side the linguistic are invalid or meaningless. What holds 
the world together, then, is the coherence of the rules by 
which language operates, the “language games” that par-
ticular communities bring into being in their construction 
of a shared, coherent reality. Similarly in Derrida, nothing 
stands outside the signifi er in the position of signifi ed: a 
word does not derive its meaning from outside the sys-
tem of language, for instance from an intention or thought 
that language refl ects or reiterates, or from a referent—a 
thing in the world—that language names. Rather, meaning 
is the effect of movement from one signifi er to the next, 
in a circulation that is “groundless” in that it rests (as in 
Wittgenstein) on nothing outside the circuit of language 
itself. And again in Lacan, the Symbolic order is a sys-
tem that does not rest on a prior reality but rather marks 
a fundamental break from reality, in which the signifi er 
is hollowed out by the absence of the thing it names: 
the Symbolic order exists in opposition to the Real, and 
can never adequately represent or embody a Real that is 
understood to lie outside all symbolic conventions . . . 
Feeling, emotion, intuition, sensation—the creatural life of 
the body and of embodied experience—tend to fall away, 
their place taken by an essentially clerical outlook that 
centers on the written text. The signifi er rules over a set 
of terms whose functions are primarily textual in scope: 
the analysis of ordinary language (Wittgenstein); of the 
circulation of meaning within the literary text (decon-
structive criticism); of the disruptions of the symbolic 
order that indicate the advent of unconscious fear and 
desire in the analysis of speech or in the discourse of the 
work of art (psychoanalysis). While the family of terms 
that owe their allegiance to the signifi er—text, discourse, 
code, meaning—is brilliantly adept at dealing with ques-
tions of signifi cation, it encounters a notable limit when 
the area that it seeks to understand exceeds the sphere of 
textual meaning. Though semiotics is often at pains to 
point out that the signifi er belongs to the sensory order, 
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it is diffi cult to modulate the term so as to include the full 
range of sensuous and emotional experience, the affective, 
the physical, and the kinesthetic.
In the last thirty years or so, discourse and de Saussure’s concep-
tualization of the sign have greatly affected the development of intertextu-
ality as the primary model used in the study of Latin literature in general 
and Latin poetry in particular. Born as a reaction to the monopoly of New 
Criticism in the Anglo-(North)American world and as a redress to the crisis 
of traditional historicism in Italy, intertextuality assigned primacy to the 
reader as meaning-making agent and, by calling into question the unity of 
a text, located meaning in the relationship of a text with prior texts and in 
the generic codes that these texts used. Discourse opened up the possibil-
ity of exploring textual relations through language and the use of generic 
codes as regular and systematic meaning-making rules. In hindsight, the 
outcome has been twofold: Latinists have been able to rework philological 
methods in order to defi ne literary genres in an interrelated manner and, 
on this basis, to construct literary histories. And they created normative 
reading practices that have drawn force and authority from the exclusion 
of the sensorial and the embodied.
In the late nineties, a number of concerns about intertextuality 
as a model began to arise, and rightly so (Barchiesi 1997). Exemplary in 
this respect is Stephen Hinds’ Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appro-
priation in Roman Poetry, published in 1998. In his book, Hinds refl ects 
on how to distinguish between allusion and the accidental confl uence of 
words or commonplaces. He also raises the issue of how to treat authorial 
intention, stressing that from the point of view of interpreters, the allud-
ing author, however conjectural, is still instrumental, still “good to think 
with” (Hinds 1998.119). Turning next to the role of reading, Hinds uses as 
a case-study the archaic Roman poets (Ennius in particular) and points out 
the extent to which readings of them in antiquity continue to inform our 
literary histories. Finally, he focuses on the status of the text under examina-
tion in relation to the alluded texts, asking what hierarchies structure their 
relationship—in other words, which of them constitutes the master-text.
In 2001, Lowell Edmunds published Intertextuality and the Read-
ing of Roman Poetry as a response to Hinds’ refl ections. In discussing 
the nature of allusions, Edmunds claims that they should be regarded as 
“pleasing or intriguing, often unordinary, uses of language that convey or 
portend some meaning valuable to the reader” (2001.xiii). Building upon 
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that, Edmunds dismisses the possibility that a poem may actually perform 
something in the world and proposes that it is “the poet’s adoption of a 
persona, his speaking in a fi ctional voice, that gives a poem its special 
status outside the ordinary uses of language” (2001.37). As for the issue 
of authorial intention, Edmunds argues that the very diffi culty of introduc-
ing information about ancient authors from outside the poems downgrades 
intentionality to nothing more than “the scholar’s rhetorical add-on at the 
conclusion of an interpretation” (2001.xii). To Hinds’ reconstruction of how 
the early Roman poets were assigned archaic status by later readers and to 
his wondering about what vantage point we should be adopting, Edmunds 
reacts by characterizing this sort of exercise as purposeless. Edmunds also 
makes the claim that in the late fi rst century B.C.E., a new type of reading 
began to develop, a type of reading centered on a cognitive and aesthetic 
experience similar to our own (2001.31, 108–09). Finally, Edmunds defi nes 
the interpretation of Roman poetry as an aesthetically based reading prac-
tice that fi nds validity in what he calls the “Latin sub-community” and the 
“conventions of its discourse” (2001.168–69).
Consciously or not, Edmunds endorses the study of poetic allu-
sions to the extent that he transforms intertextuality from one model among 
many into the only acceptable one. The position that he adopts is inevitably 
accompanied by the assumption that intertextual analyses of late repub-
lican and post-republican poetry are the very discourses and conventions 
that structure the Latin “sub-community.” Also, by claiming that there is 
nothing there beyond texts and readers, Edmunds invalidates any attempt 
to understand the agency of the author in the production of texts, the sub-
jectivities embedded in the text, and the socio-historical circumstances 
that guided the author’s choices. Such a rigid position was understandable 
thirty years or so ago, when Latinists needed to justify the secondariness 
of Latin poetry vis-à-vis their Greek counterparts and counter the positivis-
tic notion of texts “as transparent windows looking onto an unproblematic 
external reality.”2 As Dale Wang recently put it (2013.7–8), the text is the 
author and the author is the text: the author’s history is in the text. Wang’s 
refl ection fi ts with what is already acknowledged in words when we call 
the surviving texts attributed to a particular author a corpus.3 After all, the 
 2 The citation here is from the introduction to Fowler’s unpublished manuscript, Unrolling 
the Text.
 3 For an acknowledgement of the relationship between a literary corpus and the body of the 
author, see Gowers 2009.17–37.
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text is the way in which the author makes himself present in the world, with 
his experience of the world driving the way he goes about it. Accordingly, 
Edmunds’ interpretation of Roman poetry as an aesthetically pleasant read-
ing practice is valid only in part, as his understanding of aesthetics as an 
exclusively intellectual reading exercise disregards the sensory dimension 
of aesthetics itself and rules out differences in sensibilities, be they related 
to the contextual circumstances of the author or the reader.
The same holds true for those Latinists who, like Charles Mar-
tindale (1993 and 2005), defend the superior hermeneutical value of “lit-
erature” by invoking the return of aesthetics in the form of a judgment of 
taste based on a “disinterested” appreciation of beauty. These views draw 
on very specifi c philosophical interventions (Kant and the British empiri-
cists). The contextual and historical ramifi cations of these interventions 
cannot be emphasized enough; however, when reworked into infl exible 
interpretative frameworks, they enable “a narcissistic suppression of the 
‘other’/author in favor of a multiplication of the ‘self’/reader”—as one of 
Arethusa’s readers puts it—that rests on a series of acts of separation: the 
separation of the redeemed from the damned, of the purifi ed from the 
corrupt and the degraded, and, I would add, of the whole from the frag-
mentary, and of the mind from the body.4 In the study of Latin literature, 
these views have reinforced existing binaries (poetry vs. prose, written 
vs. oral, form vs. history) and have hampered divergent approaches and 
collaborative efforts.5
Questions about the sensory and the sensual should not be dis-
missed, nor should they be seen as oppositional to discourse, the aesthetic, 
or the intellectual. Language—whether written or not, spoken or not—has 
a performative dimension to it that is based on its materiality. If in the 
realm of philosophy, thinkers like J. L. Austin and Judith Butler (to cite 
just the most infl uential) speculate about how to do things with words and 
how words do things, linguists working in the area of phonetics and pho-
nology teach us that language is material and that it is through its materi-
ality that human communication takes place.6 Perhaps it would be a good 
idea to start by admitting that (1) whenever we use language we express 
in very material terms our positioning in the unfathomable networks that 
 4 For the language used here, see Mitchell 2005.147. 
 5 To have a sense of the dynamics of the discussion, see Habinek 1998 and 2005a, Goldberg 
2005, Feeney and Katz 2006, and Sciarrino 2011.1–37.
 6 Austin [1962] 1975 and Butler 1993, 1997. 
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make up communities or sub-communities, and that (2) we are always 
interested even when all we want is to appreciate beauty in its pure form.
The world is not made up only of language and linguistic signs 
but of images as well. How we think about images and how we think 
about how they affect each and every one of us makes a difference. Images 
impose themselves through objects; texts are objects too, and the words 
that they contain affect us in a less immediate way than images, perhaps, 
but with similar results. Words in texts—regardless of whether they are 
silently read or listened to—and images embedded in art objects impress 
themselves upon our minds.7 We may call these mental impressions “imagi-
nary”; using such a term does not make them any less a product of physi-
cal processes in the brain.8 In what follows, I draw on some refl ections on 
the power of images in order to establish the basis for a fresh view of the 
allures of intertextuality and Roman ways of perceiving texts. What I am 
entertaining here is a cross-modal analogy between images and texts in 
order to illuminate what strictly textual/linguistic/discursive analyses do 
not allow us to appreciate in full.
THE HYPERREAL
In a lecture presented at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton 
in 2010, Horst Bredekamp discussed the power of images by taking as a 
point of departure Leonardo da Vinci’s ideas about painting.9 We know 
about these ideas because Leonardo jotted them down. These writings were 
gathered together after his death in what is now known as Il Trattato della 
pittura. Here Leonardo speaks on behalf of painters and in opposition to 
poets. At one point he asserts (Trattato della pittura 9):
Il pittore è padrone di tutte le cose che possono cadere in 
pensiero all’uomo, perciocché s’egli ha desiderio di vedere 
bellezze che lo innamorino, egli è signore di generarle e 
 7 Classicists are well aware that, in the ancient world, images and objects were everywhere, 
and have long been exploring their relationship with texts. The bibliography is massive; I 
cite here only three representative studies: P. Zanker 1990 (for Augustan Rome), Steiner 
2002 (for archaic and classical Greece), and G. Zanker 2004 (for the Hellenistic period). 
Bredekamp also cites the very infl uential Svenbro 1993, whose publication sparked a huge 
debate about orality and textuality that continues to this day.
 8 For a variety of interventions from diverse perspectives, see Stafford 2011.
 9 Bredekamp 2010. What follows refers to and expands on his video-recorded lecture. 
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se vuol vedere cose mostruose che spaventino, o che sieno 
buffonesche e risibili, o veramente compassionevoli, ei 
n’è signore e creatore.
The painter is master of all things that can fall into the 
mind of man; insofar as he (man/painter) desires to see 
beauties that enamor him, he is the god who generates 
them; and if he wants to see monstrous things that trig-
ger fear or that are clownish or laughable or truly pity-
inducing, he is lord and creator of them.
The power of the painter is here assimilated to that of God in his 
ability to create a reality that he or other men (or both) desire. The use of 
pronouns in this passage produces a slight referential confusion, and this 
confusion points to the merging of the “I” of the painter and the “I” of 
mankind collectively understood (uomo). The merging, happening at the 
level of language, is also a merging of different realities and subjectivi-
ties; in this merging, the painting is an object fi gured as a manifestation of 
individual and collective desires and the painter as the agent who makes 
these desires not only materially and spatially present but alive as well.
In his Princeton lecture, Bredekamp cites another extract from 
Leonardo’s writings in order to refl ect on the liveliness of images: “non 
iscoprire se libertà t’è cara / ch’l volto mio è carcere d’amore” (“Do not 
uncover if freedom is dear to you, because my face is a prison of love”).10 
It would appear that these lines were meant to serve as a legend appended 
to a portrait; if so, through them, Leonardo expresses the creative power 
of the painter by endowing the art object with speech—a speech in which 
the object articulates the captivating qualities of the painted image. In the 
same lecture, Bredekamp notes that Leonardo was aware “that the world 
is fi lled with forces of such violence that they cannot be comprehended 
entirely by the senses and that require the help of art. Art is able to gener-
ate an effective surplus that does not imitate reality but produces a super-
reality.” To put it in Leonardo’s terms, this super-reality is what binds the 
beholder in a state of amorous, if not erotic, imprisonment and expresses 
what I would call the “sentiment of love.”
10 Leonardo, South Kensington Museum 3, f. 85 recto = Forster III, f. 10 verso. I 
have the impression that Bredekamp in his lecture does not cite the second line; this is 
not crucial to his argument, but it is for mine. 
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Generally speaking (and paraphrasing what we fi nd in Wikipedia), 
I here use “sentiment” much the way people working in the fi eld of opinion 
mining do when they attempt to identify and extract subjective informa-
tion in source materials.11 In that fi eld, sentiment amounts to the attitude 
and inclination of a speaker, writer, or artist with respect to an object and 
the overall “contextual polarity” or, better perhaps, “magnetic attraction” 
towards that object. Attitude and inclination include his or her judgment 
or evaluation, their affective state when speaking, writing, or making 
an object, and the intended communication (that is to say, the emotional 
effects the artist, author, or speaker wishes to have on the listener, reader, 
or beholder). In sentiment analysis, the task is to classify that magnetism. 
Clearly, the same sort of analysis should encompass the listener, the reader, 
or the beholder as they also are affected by “magnetic attraction.” Put in 
purely linguistic terms, magnetism belongs to the realm of langue, but in 
order to get to that, the analysis must necessarily start from experiential 
manifestations in the realm of parole. Sentiment analysts start from and go 
back to the realm of emotions by classifying, for instance, emotional states 
such as “angry,” “sad,” “happy”; afterwards, they reconstitute the underly-
ing sentiment and the inclination of the subject at some particular moments. 
This method can help us defi ne better Bredekamp’s idea of super-reality.
In a dialogue with Barbara Stafford published by Tate etc., Bre-
dekamp defi nes super-reality as an intensifi ed form of reality and names 
it “hyperreality.” Moreover, he suggests that hyperreality has “a paradoxi-
cal existence”:12 on the one hand, you have compression or contraction, 
on the other hand, you have revelation by magnifi cation. In other words, 
the perceptual reality is compressed into the confi nes of the art object; in 
turn, the art object reveals that reality and magnifi es it within the limits 
of the art object itself. In a way, the art object comes to encompass the 
whole world in a compressed manner. For Bredekamp, hyperrealism is 
very effective primarily because it possesses a “phatic” dimension. Roman 
Jakobson introduced the term “phatic” to refer to any linguistic expression 
that is meant to elicit an immediate and focused response. Phatic expres-
sions include: “Hello?” “Hi there!” “What’s up?” and the like (Jakobson 
1970.217). Redeployed in the study of images, Paul Virilio defi nes “phatic 
image” in his The Vision Machine in the following way (1994.14): “The 
11 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sentiment_analysis
12 Here I am freely paraphrasing and adding to Bredekamp 2006.
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phatic image—a targeted image that forces you to look and holds your 
attention—is not a pure product of photographic and cinematic focus-
ing. More importantly it is the result of an ever-brighter illumination, of 
the intensity of its defi nition, singling out only specifi c areas, the context 
mostly disappearing into a blur.”
Thus compression and magnifi cation in visual art produce hyper-
reality and affect the beholders by grabbing their attention at the expense 
of everything else that occupies the perceptive space available to them. 
But there is more. For Bredekamp, hyperrealism also meets and captures 
the human desire for transcendence, that is, the aspiration to liberate the 
self from its material existence. Inevitably, this aspiration leads to a return 
(in)to the material and the body of all involved. Whether this return is to 
be understood as a fall from grace depends on the value that we attribute 
to the material and the body, and how much we cherish the relationship 
of both the material and the body with the mind. Moreover, as Barbara 
Stafford notes during the same conversation (2006), “Hyperreality is an 
instrument of activity that goes beyond pure visualization. With hyperre-
ality there is always a question of identity . . . [for] it perpetually defl ects 
the question of where is the real in its overproduction of too many or too 
much, so that one is unable to make a decision.”
In my view, there is no decision to be made, for it would appear 
that reality, hyperreality, and unreality stand in a relationship of interact-
ing continuity. We may conceive reality as sitting somewhere in between 
the hyperreal and the unreal. We could perhaps represent it in terms of 
degrees of belonging to dualistic sets like truth and fi ction, objective and 
subjective, material and immaterial, body and mind, and so on. Whatever 
the case, the degree of belonging to any or all of these sets would depend 
on the pattern recognitions of both the creator of the object and its beholder. 
How these patterns are shaped and how, in turn, their shape affects classi-
fi cations and actions are matters that lie in the hands of humanists. What I 
would like to do next, then, is think more directly about Latin poetry and 
intertextuality in light of the notion of hyperreal.
HYPERREAL AND TEXTS
Whatever falls within a text can be defi ned as hyperreal to the extent that 
it is both a compression and a magnifi cation of the world that is contained 
within the limits of the written object and achieved by means of words pro-
duced by an author. This is so regardless of what the writing material is or 
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what form the writing takes. This is not to say that these material aspects 
do not matter; as I discuss later, they carry a great deal of importance.13 At 
another level, a text materially conceived is a microcosm of its own that, as 
intertextuality has taught us, is linked to other texts. Intertextualists tend 
to be engrossed especially with the thematic and lexicological features of 
a text and on how they relate to previous or contemporary texts within 
the literary archive. I suggest that attention be paid to the phatic qualities 
that texts contain and how these qualities grab and capture the attention of 
the reader/viewer. I would also insist that texts are very material, and this 
materiality manifests itself most clearly (for us) in formalities like fi gures 
of sound and metrical structures.
Needless to say, attention to these formalities is routine for every 
classicist working on poetry—and prose to a lesser degree. If we think of 
these matters in strictly material terms, a whole new world of allusions 
opens up before our eyes. These allusions exceed the limits of the text and 
the textual tradition, and come to encompass the author’s own magnetic 
attraction towards his text. Put in terms of discourse, they spill into langue, 
into signifi cation. This is culturally and contextually determined and not 
entirely intellectual, as signifi cation also includes, to paraphrase Bryson 
2003, a full range of sensuous and emotional experiences: the affective, 
the physical, and the kinesthetic. Compressed and magnifi ed in the text, 
and mediated through the choice and arrangement of linguistic signs, these 
experiences exude that “sentiment of love” that—as Leonardo recognizes 
in relationship to painting—imprisons the reader and the author in the 
text at any given time. Accordingly, we should be mindful of the phatic 
dimension that texts contain and how these grab and capture the reader’s 
attention. Roman poets and others were well aware of this power. I will 
exemplify my point by turning to the fi rst lines of Horace’s Ars Poetica 
and then to a few Catonian fragments:
Humano capiti ceruicem pictor equinam
iungere si uelit et uarias inducere plumas
undique collatis membris, ut turpiter atrum
desinat in piscem mulier formosa superne,
spectatum admissi, risum teneatis, amici?  5
13 Winsbury 2009.15–45 is an introduction to the issue of writing materials in the 
Roman world. References are scattered, but on wax tablets, see the excellent book by 
Meyer 2004. 
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Credite, Pisones, isti tabulae fore librum
persimilem, cuius, uelut aegri somnia, uanae
fi ngentur species, ut nec pes nec caput uni
reddatur formae. «Pictoribus atque poetis
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas.» 10
Scimus, et hanc ueniam petimusque damusque uicissim.
If a painter should like to place a human head
On a horse’s neck, with a melding of limbs covered
Everywhere with multi-colored plumage, so
That what was a lovely woman, at the top,
May end repulsively in the tail of a black fi sh:
Asked to a viewing, could you stifl e laughter, my 
friends?
Believe me, a book would be similar to such a picture,
Dear Pisones, if its hollow appearances were fi gured 
like the dreams
Of a sick person, that neither head nor foot could be 
reduced
To a unifi ed form. “But painters and poets
Have always shared an equal power of daring 
anything.”
We know it, and we claim that license, and grant it in 
turn.
(trans. A. S. Kline, slightly modifi ed)
In this passage, Horace displays the same keen awareness of the 
power of poets and painters that Leonardo manifests later. Poets and paint-
ers are assimilated as equal stakeholders and shareholders of the power 
(potestas in line 10) of creating whatever reality they choose, but only to 
a point. In fact, Horace circumscribes their power within the limits of the 
Aristotelian model of formal unity (una forma, lines 8–9). As a poet, Hor-
ace makes his potestas present through the text that we read and expresses 
his allegiance to formal unity by constraining his words within the bounds 
of the hexameter and by offering a version of reality that has a beginning, 
a middle, and an end. Horace here endows his text with liveliness by fi g-
uring an interaction between his poetic “I” and the “you” of the Pisones 
(his addressees). The reality created by the interaction is not fi ctional, 
imaginary, or unreal; it is, fi rst of all, hyperreal insofar as it compresses 
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the world to just this interaction and magnifi es this interaction to the exclu-
sion of everything else.
Moreover, in this passage, the sentence “Pictoribus atque poetis / 
quidlibet audendi semper fuit aequa potestas” (lines 9–10) does the job of 
phatically capturing the attention of readers and their desire to transcend 
the “here and now” (see semper, line 10). Accordingly, Horace alerts us to 
the fact that poetry (like painting) does not allow readers to stand outside 
the text and freely eavesdrop on what goes on inside the confi nes of the 
text. Rather, the hyperreality of the text becomes a reality that allures and 
traps everyone involved; in our case, these include the poetic ego, the fi g-
ured Pisones, and the readers. As readers, then, we end up being blinded 
by the illusionary trick that Horace plays: by dissecting the allusive texture 
of his poem, we participate in the poet’s game of fl aunting mastery over 
the Graeco-Roman tradition. By enjoying the pleasure of the text, we fall 
into a state of admiration and awe for Horace’s poetic skills.
Intertextuality thrives on the hyperreal, and the poetic game 
empowers it. From a scholarly point of view, intertextuality is at its best in 
its attempt to reconstruct the network of associations that any given poetic 
text establishes with other texts and textual traditions. The reconstruction 
of this network enables us to identify with a degree of certainty the kind 
of cultural materials that were available at the time of a text’s production. 
What makes intertextuality problematic is that it encloses the materiality 
of history and the body within the bounds of poetic allusions and seamless 
literary genealogies. As a result, we fall for an erotic game that is hard to 
give up and lose interest in the numerous rifts and accommodations that 
informed the history of Latin poetry and its embodied and material nature.
THE MATERIALITY OF POETRY
The beginnings of Latin poetry are associated in the sources with the trans-
lation practices of a small group of professional immigrants who moved 
to Rome in the late third and early second centuries B.C.E. Intertextuality 
has tended to look at early poetry as some sort of literary bridge between 
Greece and Rome or as an unproblematic source of poetic allusions more 
fully developed by later (and more mature) authors. From the same period, 
however, other texts have survived; among these are the writings attrib-
uted to Cato the Censor.
When we apply to Cato’s writings the criteria that we use for 
the study of Latin poetry, we cannot avoid feeling confused. On the one 
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hand, these writings bear features that defy our ability to straightforwardly 
identify allusions to Greek precedents; on the other hand, the only texts in 
Latin that we have from more or less the same period are scraps of laws, 
ritual regulations, inscriptions in tombs and temples, and the like. Later 
authors represent the formalities that characterize these texts as shapelessly 
fl uid and primitive, and oppose them to the sophisticated “shapeliness” of 
metrical norms and Greek models. These shapeless cultural expressions 
are generally associated with the carmen.
Thomas Habinek introduced the use of the term carmen as a 
synonym of song in order to systematize the various forms of ritualized 
speech that characterize the Latin literary corpus and undo the opposition 
between oral and written (Habinek 2005a and b). In a recent work on the 
formation of Latin prose, I suggest that in the late third and early second 
centuries B.C.E., the carmen was associated with pre-poetic and non-poetic 
cultural expressions and was characterized by very distinctive strategies. 
These strategies are not only verbal but bodily as well. At a verbal level, 
they are normally bracketed under the rubric “carmen-style” and include 
juxtaposing longer and shorter compositional segments, manipulating fi g-
ures of sound, and stringing together two or three words.14 At the level of 
the body, they typify activities that were perceived as vital for connecting 
the polity and its people to the cosmic whole and as empowering ploys for 
making this connection present for the cognitive endorsement of all. One 
of these activities involved the production of tabulae.
In her recent work on tabulae (2004), Elizabeth Meyer argues 
that these objects were embedded in actions undertaken on behalf of the 
legitimate and desired socio-cosmological order. Not surprisingly, these 
tabulae tend to bear compositions presenting carmen-like features. In turn, 
the fact that the carmen-style also characterizes compositions fashioned 
outside the sphere of legitimate power (that is, in the sphere of magic, 
generally speaking) and that this outside sphere was tightly policed give 
us clues about the performative potency that any invocation of the carmen 
(embodied or textual) was believed to possess.15
14 For defi nitions of the carmen-style, see Norden 1986.172–73, Palmer 1961.346–57, 
Timpanaro 1988.257–61, von Albrecht 1989.9–20, and Courtney 1999.1–11.
15 On this specifi c point, see Meyer 2004.103–07. In his recent thesis, Maxime Pierre 2008 
argues that a carmen is an utterance that carries its authority within itself, i.e., it has an 
authority that is not derived from the social authority of its author. The fi rst sign of car-
men policing is to be found in the Twelve Tables (7.3).
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In the Preface to the Origines, Cato invokes the carmen in at least 
two of the remaining fragments. The fi rst reads as follows:16
grauissimus auctor in Originibus dixit Cato “morem apud 
maiores hunc epularum fuisse, ut deinceps, qui accubar-
ent, canerent ad tibiam clarorum uirorum laudes atque 
uirtutes.”
That most sober author Cato said in the Origines that 
there was the following custom during banquets among 
the ancestors: those who reclined would sing in turn to 
the sound of the pipe the praises and the manly deeds of 
famous men.
This fragment features a scene in which a select group of people 
is gathered at a convivium. While reclining, these people sing and praise 
the manly deeds of clari viri in turn. Here the phrase apud maiores and 
the use of the imperfect are phatically meant to command attention to two 
claims: that individuals acquire perceptual distinctiveness or claritas on 
the basis of their achievements and that objectifi ed in song, these achieve-
ments serve as behavioral standards for the reproduction of the group and 
of social hierarchies at the same time.17 In another fragment belonging to 
the Preface, Cato adds:
Etenim M. Catonis illud quod in principio scripsit Origi-
num suarum, semper magnifi cum et praeclarum putavi, 
“clarorum hominum atque magnorum non minus otii quam 
negotii rationem exstare oportet.”18
Indeed, I always deemed magnifi cent and outstanding what 
Cato wrote at the beginning of his Origines, that no less 
16 Cicero Tusc. Disp. 4.3 = Cato Orig. 1.4 C&Sbl.
17 For a discussion of claritas as perceptual distinctiveness, either auditory or visual, 
and its difference from gloria, see Habinek 2000.269–70. For an account of Cicero’s 
understanding of gloria, see Mazzoli 2004. 
18 Cicero pro Planc. 66 = Cato Orig. 1.2 C&Sbl. Imitated with variations by Cicero 
ad Att. 5.20.9, Symmachus Epist. 1.1.2, Ennodius Carm. 1.9.3, and Columella RR 2.21.1.
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an account of leisure time than of work time of famous 
and great men ought to remain.
Here Cato invokes the fi nancial accounts (rationes) that male 
Roman citizens wrote on tabulae and presented to the censor. During the 
taking of the census, the rationes embodied the ability of male Roman 
citizens to manage their households and constituted the means by which 
these men were accorded responsibilities and privileges.19 In the Origines, 
the invocation of these rationes serves to defi ne a specifi c type of text. 
Produced by eminent men, these texts are supposed to objectify in words 
their social performances and fulfi ll the same socially reproductive func-
tion attributed to the singing of convivial songs.
From Cato’s writings, subjectivity emerges as shaped by different 
experiences of the world and by a keen sense of the body’s connectedness 
with a socio-cosmological order in which things have meaning in them-
selves. This bodily connectedness or “worldly presence” (if you like) is 
not achieved through the creation of texts bearing allusions to a previous 
textual tradition made up of allusions; rather, it is based on a very practical 
adherence to a socio-cosmological order materially perceived and materially 
expressed.20 In this world, texts are material objects, monumenta, that bring 
to mind and make discernible a person’s ability to live up to the potential 
associated with his place in the world. The censorial ceremony, with the 
presentation of written accounts (rationes) by the pater familias to the cen-
sor, on one side, and the censor’s production of a citizen list that system-
atizes citizens according to class, on the other side, are signal expressions 
of this perception of both personhood and texts. Against this perception, 
literature is both menacing and attractive. A fragment by Cato attributed 
to the so-called ad Filium could not make this point more conspicuously:21
Dicam de istis Graecis suo loco, Marce fi li, quid Athe-
nis exquisitum habeam, et quod bonum sit illorum lit-
teras inspicere, non perdiscere. Vincam nequissimum et 
19 On census taking and the writing involved, see, generally, Nicolet 1980.48–88, 
Lemosse 1949.177, and Gargola 1995.76–77. On the marked aspect of writing on tabulae, 
see Meyer 2004.91–92; on ritualized forms of reading, see Valette-Cagnac 1997.
20 I am here drawing on the typological distinction between “meaning cultures” and 
“presence cultures” outlined by Gumbrecht 2004.78–86.
21 Cato ad Filium 1 C&Sbl = Pliny NH 29.14.
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indocile esse genus illorum. Et hoc puta vatem dixisse: 
quandoque ista gens suas litteras dabit, omnia conrumpet, 
tum etiam magis, si medicos suos huc mittet. Iurarunt 
inter se barbaros necare omnis medicina, sed hoc ipsum 
mercede faciunt ut fi des iis sit et facile disperdant. Nos 
quoque dictitant barbaros et spurcius nos quam alios Opi-
con appellatione foedant. Interdixi de medicis.
I shall speak about those Greeks in the proper place, Mar-
cus my son, as to what I found out in Athens and what 
benefi t there is in looking into their writings—not in learn-
ing them thoroughly. I will demonstrate that their race is 
most despicable and intractable. You should reckon what 
follows as pronounced by a vates: whenever this race will 
give its literature, it will corrupt everything; all the more 
so, if they will send their doctors here. They have taken an 
oath among themselves to kill all the barbarians by their 
medicine, but they do this very thing for a fee, so that 
they may be trusted and destroy easily. They also speak 
of us all the time as barbarians, and they insult us more 
fi lthily than others by calling us Opici. I have forbidden 
you to deal with doctors.
This fragment opens by featuring Cato’s “speaking I” addressing 
his son and promising him that he would deal with the Greeks on another 
occasion. Through this deferral, Cato situates the Greeks in an Athens con-
strued as peripheral that he has self-confi dently examined and represents 
their writings as objects that are both alien and alienable.22 The alienable 
features that Cato attaches to Greek literature are here made prominent in 
his use of dare (to give). Produced by a despicable and fi ckle race, these 
writings—he warns his son—may be inspected (inspicere), but should not 
be learned thoroughly (perdiscere). Moreover, Cato predicts that Greek lit-
erature holds the potential to undo (conrumpere) everything and equates his 
pronouncement with that of a vates. As a fi gure of pre-poetic Roman song 
22 See Dench 2005.324–26 and Dupont 2005. The question of ownership of Greek 
literature comes vividly into play in Horace Ars 128–35, where Greek literary texts are 
defi ned as communis (128) and publica materies (131). Through poetic manipulation and 
translation, these become an area of ius privatus (131). 
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rejected at this time by Ennius, the vates becomes in this context a prop that 
empowers Cato’s self-positioning.23 In what follows, Cato abruptly shifts 
his focus from literature to medicine and characterizes Greek doctors as 
conspirators and assassins operating under the guise of paid professionals. 
The language of destruction (necare, disperdere) that he uses at this point 
recalls the ruinous power (conrumpere) previously attributed to Greek lit-
erature. In turn, the echo suggests that Cato’s distinction between inspicere 
and perdiscere does not rest simply on a different degree of attention paid 
to texts but also (and more poignantly) on the extent to which what is read 
penetrates the mind and molds both body and actions.
Like Leonardo and Horace, Cato acknowledges here the capti-
vating power of the hyperreal; as opposed to them, he tries to contain it. 
Although poetry does not feature in this fragment, it is interesting to see 
that in marginalizing Greek literature both ethnically and geographically, 
Cato marginalizes the sources from which the early Latin poets drew mate-
rial in order to create their craft. Cato resists the power of the hyperreal 
by adopting a whole series of binaries. These include Greek vs. Roman, 
himself vs. his son, literature vs. carmen, elite vs. professional, we vs. 
them, killing vs. generating, and so on. We may, indeed, choose to ignore 
these binaries and continue to represent Cato’s views as backwards and 
unsophisticated; however, by giving some serious thought to what Cato 
says: poetry presupposes a mental intake that is bodily as well, we open 
up ourselves to the possibility of reading Roman poetry against its grain. 
Certainly, once we move our attention away from textual allusions as 
such and start taking the body factor into full account, we run the risk of 
writing very different literary histories and even understanding why the 
Romans did without literature for so long. The more binaries and associa-
tions we identify compressed in a text, the more are we in a position to 
acknowledge the perceptual frameworks that are at work in any given text. 
As readers, this means resisting the desire to transcend the materiality of 
our own realities and the hyperreality of the texts we read.
University of Canterbury, Christchurch
23 Cato’s adoption of the vates as an authoritative prop counters the negative over-
tones that are made manifest in Livy’s narrative of the Bacchanalian affair of 186 B.C.E. 
(39.8–18). This suggests changes in the social location of the vates and a tightening of 
control over religious practices. See also Gildenhard 2007.87–92, Wiseman 2006, Habinek 
2005a.227–28, and Gruen 1990.34–78.
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